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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
United States Constitution Amendment I:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.
New York Constitution Article 1, Section 8:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Fraser'
(decided February 20, 2001)
Paul Fraser was charged with two counts of possessing a
sexual lerformance by a child in violation of Penal Law Section
263.16, as well as possessing an obscene sexual performance by a
child.3 Prior to trial, the People moved to dismiss the charges of
obscene sexual performance and proceeded solely on the two
counts of Penal Law Section 263.16.4 Fraser was convicted on
both counts and sentenced to five years proba:ion, 550 hours of
community service and a $1000 fine.5 On appeal, the Appellate
'96 N.Y.2d 318, 752 N.E.2d 244, 728 N.Y.S.2d 115 (2001).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.16 (McKinney 2000) provides in pertinent part: "A
person is guilty of possessing a sexual performance by a child when, knowing
the character and content thereof, he knowingly has in his possession or control
any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen
years of age."
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Division, Fourth Department affirmed the conviction. 6  Fraser
contended his conviction was a violation of his rights of freedom
of expression as protected by the First Amendment 7 of the Federal
Constitution and Article I, Section 88 of the New York
Constitution. Further, Fraser alleged that his equal protection rights
under the Federa19 and Statel ° Constitutions were violated.'' He
also purported that the trial court violated his due process rights in
refusing to allow a defense of scientific justification.' 2 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the
State has a compelling interest to protect its children, and that
pornographic material involving children is not protected by the
First Amendment. 13 The court further held that defendant's equal
protection argument was also devoid of merit. 14 The New York
statutory scheme of Section 235.00(1)15 allows for possession of
6id.
7 The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend I.
8 Article 1, Section 8 provides in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty
of speech or of the press." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
9 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 Article 1, Section 11 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 11.
1 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 323-24, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
2 Id. at 324, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 325, 752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 2000) provides:
Any material or performance is "obscene" if (a) the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
the prurient interest in sex, and (b) it depicts or describes in a
patently offensive manner, actual or simulated: sexual
intercourse, sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadism,
masochism, excretion or lewd exhibition of the genitals, and
(c) considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, and scientific value. Predominant appeal shall be
* judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from
the character of the material or the circumstances of its
[Vol 18
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pornographic material, as long as the material is not defined as
obscene. 16 The court reasoned that this scheme "need only be
supported by some rational basis to survive constitutional
scrutiny."' 7 Absent a showing by the defendant that the statutory
scheme was irrational, his equal protection argument was
unsuccessful. 18
Paul Fraser held a Master's Degree in Social Work and was
a certified social worker specializing in child abuse cases. 19 When
Fraser took his computer to a repair shop for servicing, a
technician noticed some graphic files with titles that connoted
child pornography. The technician copied the files and viewed
the copy with two other employees.2 1 The files revealed pictures
of young children participating in sexual activity with adults, and
Fraser was subsequently charged with two counts of possession of
a sexual performance by a child, in violation of Penal Law Section
263.16.22
At trial, Fraser asserted an affirmative defense pursuant to
Penal Law Section 235.15(1), 23 alleging that the child pornography
he possessed did not violate the statute in that the pornography was
being used for a "scientific purpose.",24 Fraser testified that he was
dissemination to be designed for children or other specially
susceptible audience.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(2) (McKinney 2000) provides: " 'Obscene sexual
performance' means any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child
less than sixteen years of age in any material which is obscene, as such term is
defined in section 235.00 of this chapter."
16 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 325, 752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
17 Id. (quoting People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 661, 668, 623 N.E.2d 1, 603
N.Y.S.2d 280 (1993)).
18 Id. at 325-26, 752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 1.19.
19 Id. at 322, 752 N.E.2d at 245, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
20 Id. at 321, 752 N.E.2d at 245, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
21 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 322, 752 N.E.2d at 245, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
22 id.
23 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.15(1) (McKinney 2000) provides in pertinent part:
"[I]t is an affirmative defense that the persons to whom allegedly obscene or
indecent material was disseminated, or the audience to an allegedly obscene
performance consisted of persons or institutions having scientific, educational,
governmental or other similar justification for possessing, disseminating or
viewing same."
24 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d. at 322, 752 N.E.2d at 245, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
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invited to assist with a treatment program for persons convicted of
child pornography crimes, and explained that he possessed the
pornography to bolster his "scientific research" in treating persons
transmitting child pornography on the Internet.25 Fraser alleged
that he gathered the material from individuals with whom he
26communicated in child pornography chat rooms. The trial court
precluded this defense, and the New York Court of Appeals
agreed, holding that the scientific use defense is limited to either
27obscenity or offenses enumerated in Section 235, neither of
which was at issue.
28
The second defense was mistake of law, in that Fraser was
acting as though he believed his conduct was legal. 29 The trial
court denied him from asserting this defense as well, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling. The court reasoned that to utilize
the mistake of law defense, a person must base the mistaken belief
"upon an official statement of the law contained in a statute or
other enactment." 30 Defendant did not make this showing; rather
he attempted to prove that the images on his computer were not
photographs as defined by Penal Law Section 263.00(4). 3'
Therefore, the court held that this defense was also unavailable to
him.
32
On appeal, Fraser argued that his conviction violated his
First Amendment right of freedom of expression as well as his
equal protection rights under the Federal
33  and State34
25 id.
26 id.
27 Section 235 of the Penal Law includes offenses of obscenity and
disseminating indecent material to minors. N.Y. PENAL LAW §235.15
(McKinney 2000).
28 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 323, 752 N.E.2d at 246, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
29 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 322, 752 N.E.2d at 246, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
30 Id. at 326, 752 N.E.2d at 249, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
31 Id. at 327, 752 N.E.2d at 249, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 120. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.00(4) (McKinney 2000) provides: " 'Performance' means any play,
motion picture, photograph or dance. Performance also means any other visual
representation exhibited before an audience."
32 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 327, 752 N.E.2d at 249, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
33 See supra note 9. The Equal Protection Clause is found in Section 1 of the
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Constitutions.3 5 In particular, he asserted that the unavailability of
a "scientific justification" affirmative defense renders the child
pornography statute unconstitutional3 6  Further, the defendant
argued that the trial court's denial of his defense of scientific
justification violated his due process rights.3 7  The New York
Court of Appeals did not subscribe to anay of defendant's
arguments.
The court began its analysis with Fraser's allegation that
his conviction violated his First Amendment ight of freedom of
expression. 38 The court initially cited the United States Supreme
Court case of New York v. Ferber.39 In Ferber, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York Penal
Law statute, reasoning that child pomography is not within the
protection of the First Amendment. 40  Ferber, a proprietor of a
bookstore in Manhattan that specialized in sexually oriented
products, sold two films to an undercover police officer depicting
young boys masturbating. 41  Ferber was indicted and later
convicted on two counts of violating Section 263.15.42
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Section 263.15 violated the First Amendment, finding the statute to
be underinclusive and overbroad. 43 The statute was underinclusive
in that it did not prohibit the distribution of films of other
dangerous activity, and was overbroad because it prohibited the
distribution of materials made outside the State, as well as medical
books and educational sources. 4
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's
petition for certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the New York
34 See supra note 8, 10. New York's free speech and equal protection rights are
enumerated in Article I of its Constitution. N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 8, 11.
35 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 323-24, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
36 Id. at 324, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
37 id.
38 Id.
39 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
40 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. At issue in Ferber was the constitutionality of
Penal Law § 263.15, which does not require proof that the material be obscene.
4"Id. at 751-52.421 d. at 752.
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Legislature could, consistent with the First Amendment, "prohibit
the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in
sexual conduct, regardless of whether such material is obscene," in
an effort to prevent the abuse of children forced to engage in
sexual conduct for commercial purposes.45 The Supreme Court
answered the question in the affirmative, reversing the judgment of
46New York's highest court. The Court wrote,
when a definable class of material, such as that
covered by Section 263.15, bears so heavily and
pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing
interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to
consider these materials as without the protection of
the First Amendment.47
The Ferber Court further declared that, "a work which, taken on
the whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child
pornography. 'It is irrelevant to the child who has been abused
whether or not the material ... has a literary, artistic, political or
social value.' ,48
The New York Court of Appeals in Fraser next discussed
the compelling interest a state has in protecting its children.49 The
court cited the United States Supreme Court case of Osborne v.
Ohio 50 as support for this notion.5 1 In Osborne, the Supreme
Court reiterated its own decision in Ferber, holding that the state
has an interest in stamping out child pornography. The Ferber
Court had reasoned that the compelling state interest in eliminating
child pornography, and in preventing child exploitation and abuse
justified the prohibition against child pornography.53 In Osborne,
the United States Supreme Court upheld an Ohio statute that
45 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
46 Id. at 774.
47 id.
48 Id. at 761 (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support of
§ 263.15).
49 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 324, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
50 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
5' Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 324, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
52 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110.
53 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
276 [Vol 18
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prohibited the mere possession of child pornography.54  To
accomplish this goal, Ohio enacted a statute similar to the statute at
issue in Fraser, but not as narrowly drawn. 55 Petitioner, Clyde
Osborne, was convicted of violating this statute and sentenced to
six months in prison after four photographs were found in his
home depicting nude male adolescents posed in sexually explicit
positions.56 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, holding that a state cannot regulate: private thoughts
and possessions of adults, but it could, however, try to terminate a
market that exploits its children. 57 The Court recognized that a
state's interest in regulating the possession of child pornography
included not only the children used to create the material but also
the protection of children who may be sexually abused by
pedophiles who use child pornography to entice their victims to
engage in sexual conduct.
58
The statute at issue in Osborne did contain exceptions for
possessing child pornography such as literary, educational and
scientific purposes, but the Supreme Court's opinion did not
indicate that these limitations were required for a statute to pass
54 Id.
55 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106. Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (West
1989) provides in pertinent part:
(A) No person shall do any of the following:
(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a
minor who is not the person's child or ward in a state of
nudity, unless one of the following applies:
(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated,
displayed, possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be
brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic,
medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental,
judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician,
psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing
bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor,
judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material
or performance.
(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian
has consented in writing to the photographing cr use of the
minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the
material or performance is used or transferred.
56 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107.
5' Id. at 109.58 Id. at 111.
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constitutional muster.5 9 The same conclusion was drawn by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Matthews,60 as
well as the Court of Appeals of Washington in State v. Williams.
61
In Matthews, a journalist was convicted under a federal statute for
sending and receiving child pornography over the Internet.62 The
reporter contended that he was researching a news story and was
entitled to a defense of valid journalistic purpose, even though the
statute did not provide such a defense. 63 Defendant maintained
that the First Amendment entitled him to a defense under the
statute.64 The federal court held, as a matter of first impression,
that no such defense exists within the "penumbra" of the First
Amendment.65 Following the holding in Ferber, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that Matthews' asserted defense "misses the fundamental
distinction between child pornography and adult pornography that
the Ferber Court sought to draw." 66  The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction, stating that although the defense may be
available in obscene adult pornography, defendant's First
Amendment rights are not violated by denying him the defense in
the context of child pornography. 67 The court reasoned that child
pornography, even if it contains literary, artistic or journalistic
value, that value does not outweigh the abuse and harm caused to
children, and therefore the statute at issue was found
constitutional .68
In Williams, the Washington Court of Appeals concluded
that its state child pornography statute was constitutional, relying
on many of the same principles as the Matthews court. 6 9  In
Williams, the defendant was charged with possession of depictions
of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 70 Defendant
59 d. at 114.
60 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000).
61 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1654 (1998).
62 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 339.
63 Id. at 342.
64 1d.
65 Id. at 345.
66 Id.
67 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 345.
68 Id.
69 Williams, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1654 at **1-2.
70 Id. at *4.
[Vol 18
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claimed the Washington statute was overbroad, both facially and
applied, as it failed to safeguard legitimate scientific, medical, or
educational activities.71 The state court held that the statute was
not overbroad, given the overriding [state] government concern for
the physical and mental health of its children.72 Although the
statute did not include an affirmative defense for journalistic
purposes, defendant's First Amendment rights were not violated
because the state's interest in protecting its children overrode
defendant's interest in possessing this material for "legitimate
purposes. 73
The statute at issue in Osborne was also not
unconstitutionally overbroad, as the Court interpreted the statute to
apply only to depictions of nudity involving a lewd exhibition or
graphic focus on the minor's genitals. 74 The Osborne Court noted
that the term "lewd exhibition of the genitals" is familiar in this
area, and was first offered in Miller v. California7 5 as an example
of a permissible regulation. 76 The United States Supreme Court in
Miller gave examples of what a state statute could define for
regulation including "[p]atently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals.,
77
In Fraser, the defendant also argued on appeal that his
conviction violated his equal protection rights under the Federal
and State Constitutions. 78 The New York Court of Appeals was
not persuaded by this argument either.79 Defendant argued that
Penal Law Section 263.16 violated the equal protection guaranteed
by the Federal and New York Constitutions, because it
criminalized possession of pornographic material allowed under
Penal Law article 235,80 if that same pornography were classified
71 Id. at *'11-12.
72 Id. at **13-14.
73 Id. at *14.
74 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 113.7' 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
76 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114.
77 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
78 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 325,752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
79 Id.
80N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235 (McKinney 2000) provides in pertinent part:
2002 279
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as obscene.81 The court held that even though the statutory scheme
of New York treats the offenses differently, it "need only be
supported by some rational basis to survive constitutional
scrutiny., 8 2  Defendant made no showing that New York's
statutory scheme was irrational or contrary to public policy, and
therefore his equal protection argument did not carry the day.
83
In the area of child pornography, Federal and New York
law are similar with respect to an individual's right to free speech.
However, as discussed in Ferber, the United States Supreme Court
held that states are entitled to greater leeway in regulating the
pornographic depictions of children.84  As support for this
contention, the Court enumerated five reasons why the states
should enjoy this additional authority.85  First, the judgment of
state legislatures that children used in pornographic material are
harmed emotionally and physiologically, easily passes a First
Amendment test.86 Second, the standard promulgated by Miller
for determining legally obscene material is not a solution to the
problem of child pornography. 87 The Miller test "does not reflect
the state's particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting
Obscenity or disseminating indecent material to minors in the
second degree; defense
1. In any prosecution for obscenity, or disseminating indecent
material to minors in the second degree in violation of
subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article, it is an
affirmative defense that the persons to whom allegedly
obscene or indecent material was disseminated, or the
audience to an allegedly obscene performance, consisted of
persons or institutions having scientific, educational,
governmental or other similar justification for possessing,
disseminating or viewing the same.
8' Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 325, 752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
82 Id. (citing People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 661, 623 N.E.2d 1, 603 N.Y.S.2d
280 (1993)).
83 Id. at 325-26, 752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
84 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
85 Id. at 756-64.
86 Id. at 758.
87 Id. at 761. The Miller standard limits obscene material to "works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
280 [Vol 18
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those who promote the sexual exploitation of children.""8 Third,
advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic
incentive for an activity that is illegal throughout the nation.
Fourth, the value of permitting children to engage in live
performances or lewd exhibitions is insignificant, if not de
minimis.90 And lastly, the Court discussed the compelling interest
New York State has in protecting its children from engaging in
pornographic acts, and such material does not warrant the
protection of the First Amendment. 91
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals in Fraser was not
willing to accept defendant's argument that his conviction violated
his First AmendMent right of freedom of expression.92  On a
federal level, the First Amendment may be interpreted to
encompass the possession of child pornography. However, as the
Fraser court noted, "[s]tates enjoy greater latitude in regulating
child pornography because of the government's compelling
interest in safeguarding its children."9 3 To protect the health,
safety and well-being of children, courts tend to uphold statutes
proscribing the possession and dissemination of pornographic
materials involving minors.94 As such, the statute at issue in
Fraser was upheld as constitutional.
Fraser's equal protection argument was also unpersuasive.
Fraser claimed that Penal Law Section 263.16 violated the equal
protection guarantees on both the state and federal level because he
was denied the opportunity to assert an affirmative defense of
scientific justification, which would have been available if he was
charged with an offense delineated in Penal Law Section 235. 95
The court again stressed the compelling state interest of preventing
child pornography as a justification for the distinction. 96 Penal Law
Section 235 did include affirmative defenses for possession,
88 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760-61.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 762.
9
' Id. at 764.
92 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 323-25, 752 N.E.2d at 246-48, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 117-
19.
93 Id. at 324, 752 N.E.2d at 247, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
94 See Ferber, Osborne, and Fraser, discussed supra.
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including scientific, educational or governmental purposes.
97
Nevertheless, the court held that this statutory scheme was
supported by a rational basis to survive constitutional scrutiny.
98
The scheme is rationally related to a state's compelling interest to
shield its children from this type of exposure. Finally, the scheme
is consistent with public policy, and will defeat challenges on First
Amendment or equal protection grounds such as in Fraser.
Evan M. Zuckerman
97 See supra note 80.
98 Fraser, 96 N.Y.2d at 325-26, 752 N.E.2d at 248, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
282 [Vol 18
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